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Workplace Pollution: Nuclear Safety, Ethics,
and the Exploitation-Avoidance Argument
Kristin Shrader-Frechette*
Introduction
Annually in the United States, 7,000 to 11,000 people die
prematurely from injuries sustained in the workplace and another
62,000 to 86,000 people die prematurely from occupationally induced
diseases.' This means that a total of nearly 100,000 workers die
needlessly each year in the United States from unsafe work
environments, even though their deaths could have been prevented.
These victims represent a largely silent minority, not only because their
number represents less than 1/1000 of the United States work force,
but also because their deaths frequently have undetected causes for
which it is difficult to hold employers responsible. Also, there are only
2,700 practicing occupational-medicine physicians in the United States
and only a handful of Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) inspectors. This is only enough to check a worksite for safety
once every 75 years. OSHA had referred thirty cases of job-related
criminal homicide to the United States Justice Department from 1980
to 1988 and only four had been prosecuted or were being prosecuted
by 1989. This was due, in part, to the Bush Administration cutting the
funding of the Justice Department section responsible for prosecuting
companies for workplace deaths.2
If the preceding figures are correct, how can society ignore victims
of the workplace environment when annual occupation-related deaths in
the United States are approximately five times greater than those
* Dr. Shrader-Frechette is O'Neill Professor of Philosophy and Concurrent Professor of
Biological Sciences at the University of Notre Dame. A former President of RAPA, she is an
author of 14 books and 280 articles dealing with risk assessment, environmental justice, and
ethics. Shrader-Frechette holds a B.A. in mathematics from Xavier University, a Ph.D. in
philosophy of science from Notre Dame. She has done postdoctoral work in economics, in
biology, and in hydrogeology.
I J. Paul Leigh, Causes of Death in the Workplace 3-7, 215 (Quorum Books 1995).
2 Id. at 3-7.
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caused by the illegal drug trade and approximately four times greater
than those caused by AIDS? One reason may be that few people are
aware of the alarming occupational-fatality data, and few
epidemiological studies (apart from several at the United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics) track worker deaths over the long term. Also, many
casualties of the workplace environment are poor African-Americans or
Hispanics, all of which have few advocates.3 Even in developed
nations, employers often have so much power, privilege, and status that
they can avoid responsibility for what happens to employees. In
developing countries, apparent injustice in the workplace environment is
even more evident. Worldwide workplace risks may be increasing, in
part, because of the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in
1995 as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO typically treats
all worker protections, including prohibitions against child labor, as
"barriers to trade" that violate the WTO international regulations by
which all member nations must abide. Because of the WTO and
GATT, workers throughout the world are facing environmental
injustices which include the inability to control the health risks that
employers impose on them.4
Still another reason society minimizes the massive number of
occupation-related fatalities is that economists tend to justify risky
workplaces on the grounds of the compensating wage differential
(CWD). 5 The CWD, or hazard-pay premium, is the alleged
increment in wages that workers in risky jobs receive. According to this
theory, employees trade safety for money on the job market, and they
know some of the workers will bear the health consequences of their
employment in a risky occupational environment.
To determine whether the CWD succeeds in justifying alleged
environmental injustices in the workplace, this essay addresses three
main issues. These issues include: (1) the theory behind the CWD used
to justify the double standard for threats in the occupational
3 See id. at 3-7, 215.
4 See Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Whose Trade Organization? Chapters 6-7 (Public
Citizen 1999); David Newton, Environmental Justice (ABC-CLIO 1996); Kristin Shrader-
Frechette, Environmnetal Justice: Creating Equality, Reclaiming Democracy (2002).
5 See generally infra nn. 19-22.
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environment; (2) the doubtful success of the exploitation-avoidance
argument for the CWXD; and (3) several prominent reasons for rejecting
the CWD as a proposed rationale for allowing apparent environmental
injustice in the workplace. After analyzing these three issues, the essay
uses the exploitation-avoidance argument to assess an empirical case:
whether the CWD provides a justification for the apparent
environmental injustice faced by the 600,000 United States workers
who have labored in government nuclear weapons plants and
laboratories.
Workplace Versus Public Standards
As a consequence of workplace risks, some policy experts argue that
there should be no double standard (occupational and public) for
exposure to various gases, chemicals, particulates, radiation, noise, and
other forms of environmental pollution. They believe that unless
industrial employees are protected by health and safety standards that
are equal to those protecting the public, workers will face environmental
injustice. According to critics of this double standard, employees ought
not to trade their health and well-being for higher wages. Moreover,
critics of the C"WD note that paying people to put themselves at risk at
work is not significantly different from murder for hire.6
Those who agree with the double standard for worker and public
exposure to environmental risk usually maintain that the CWD
compensates them for their increased risks. They also claim that
workplace risk is overemphasized and sensationalized by "the danger
establishment." 7 They say most countries, notably the United States,
have unacceptably "rigid standards" for workplace risks. For example,
for those who believe that occupational safety requirements are too
strict, a recurrent target of ridicule is the portable toilet standard for
cowboys that OSHA employs. 8
Controversy over workplace risks originated at least as early as the
emergence of a division of labor between manual and nonmanual work.
Ancient Greek and Roman writings are filled with references to the
6 Sce e.g. Nicholas Ashford, A Crisis in the Workplace: Occupational Disease and Injury
(MIT Press 1976); Nicholas Ashford & Claudia Miller, Chemical Exposures 156-158 (1991);
Nicholas Ashford et al., Human Monitoring, 8(2) Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 263-264 (1984).
7 Sce M. Douglas & A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture 9 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1982).
8 See W. K. Viscusi, Risk by Choice 114-115, 136 (Harv. Univ. Press 1983).
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diseases peculiar to various professions. Later, during the Renaissance,
miners and metal workers became the first subjects of medical research
into diseases of the workplace. Perhaps the first publication to address
occupational hazards and their prevention was a booklet written in
Germany in 1472. The booklett told goldsmiths how to avoid
poisoning by mercury and lead. In 1556, in his treatise on the mining
industry, the German mineralogist, Agricola, wrote the first known
review of miners' health problems. He noted that some women who
lived near the mines of the Carpathian Mountains in Eastern Europe
had lost seven successive husbands to mine-related accidents and
diseases. Besieging his medical colleagues and statesmen to make
workplaces safer, the Italian physician, Ramazzini, wrote Diseases of
Workers in 1700.9
Despite the historical knowledge that various diseases are associated
with particular jobs, governments have done surprisingly little to avoid
or to reduce many known occupational risks. As J. K. Wagoner of the
United States National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) has observed, two centuries have passed since Percival Pott
linked coal tars to scrotum cancer that killed young chimney sweeps in
England. Yet "thousands of coke-oven workers in steel mills around the
world continue to inhale the same deadly substances, and are dying of
lung cancer at ten times the rate of other steel workers."' 10
One reason for the continuing controversy over workplace hazards
and over whether to employ a double standard for public and
occupational risk exposures is that some nations do not appear to
protect public health and safety more rigorously than worker health and
safety. Either they have the same standards for occupational and public
environmental exposures, or they treat workers the same as other
citizens when they compensate them for accidents or injuries. For
example, in 1972 New Zealand passed a universal, state-run scheme to
compensate all victims of accidents, workers and nonworkers, alike. In
9 See E. Eckholm, Unhealthy Jobs, Environment 31-32 (Aug. /Sept. 1977).
10 Id. at 32. For an excellent treatment of the history of occupational risk and disease, see
D.M. Berman, Death on the Job (Monthly Review Press 1978); see also Quantitative Risk
Assessment in Regulation Chapters 3-8 (L.B. Lave ed., Brookings Institute 1992)(case studies).
Finally, see John Broome, Ethics out of Economics (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); Human
Well-being and Economic Goals (Frank Ackerman et al. eds., Island Press 1997); Frank
Ackerman, The Political Economy of Inequality (Islamnd Press 2000).
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this sense, New Zealand has no double standard for protection as the
United States does. Another reason for controversy over the safety of
the occupational environment is that United States standards for health
in the workplace appear to permit greater risks than do those of many
other nations. In terms of wage differentials for fatal-injury risk, for
example, Australian workers appear to enjoy a wage increment that is
nearly triple the United States increment for risky work. 11 And in
terms of permissible levels of chemicals in the work environment,
United States regulations are less strict than such as Germany, Sweden,
and Czechoslovakia. Standards in Argentina, Great Britain, Norway,
and Peru are approximately the same as those in the United States. In
Sweden and Germany, for example, unlike the United States, workers
have more extensive rights to be informed about hazards and to take
steps to reduce exposures. Strikes there are rare, and labor productivity
rates are among the highest in the world, while maximum-allowable-
concentration values (MACs) are among the lowest in the world. The
United States, however, has not adopted the approach of Sweden and
Germany. 12
In some respects, the former Soviet Union had a tradition of
providing for occupational justice. In 1923, the Soviet Union founded
the first hospital devoted entirely to the study and treatment of
occupational diseases. No such hospital exists in the United States. Of
course, Soviet enforcement patterns are not known, and although MAC
values may have been lower in the Soviet Union and in the new Soviet
republics, such as Belarus and Ukraine, enforcement there likely is far
less stringent than in western countries, and if so, then despite safer
environmental standards in these nations, workplace risks could be
higher.
Regardless of whose enforcement patterns are better, comparisons
between countries (such as the United States and Germany) raise a
number of interesting philosophical questions. Among these are: When
a workplace environment is so dangerous that it is unjust, do the
Germans have a more or less desirable risk philosophy than their
II See Thomas Kneisner & John Leeth, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal Injury
Risk, J. of Risk and Uncertainty 75-90 (Jan. 1991).
12 See R W. Kates, Risk Assessment of Environmental Hazards 46-47 (1978); James
Robinson, Toil and Toxics 74 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1991). For the New Zealand example, see
Tom Dwyer, Life and Death at Work 250 (Plenum Press 1991).
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American counterparts? and; Why do German MAC values tend to be
lower, often by a factor of 10 or more, than corresponding United
States standards even though Germany must confront many of the
same problems that the United States faces?13 Yet another question is
whether one can ethically justify workplace MAC values, which are
sometimes higher than corresponding values for public exposure, on the
grounds that workplace exposure time is shorter than that for the
public. Also, apart from whether risky workplace environments ought to
be improved, are lower MAC values even technically possible? If they
are possible, would they be so costly as to jeopardize the economic
well-being and the technological progress which has resulted in
enormous improvements in human welfare? If they are possible, would
they be so costly that most workers and citizens would not be willing to
pay for them by raising the price of goods and services produced in
risky ways?
Many factors are likely responsible for the more lenient
occupational safety standards in the United States as compared to those
in other countries. At least one of the reasons for the disparity is a
surprisingly lower emphasis on equity in the United States. United
States standards typically allow much higher pollution-exposure levels
for workers than for the public. In large part, this is because United
States policymakers do not believe that equity requires occupational
and public exposure levels to be the same, given that workers allegedly
receive higher pay because of their higher exposures. For example, the
United States maximum permissible dose of whole-body ionizing
radiation which can be received annually by the public is 100 millirems
(mrems). The maximum permissible dose for the same time period for
industrial workers is 2,000 mrems per year, averaged over five years,
with a maximum of 5,000 mrems for any given year. Thus, a nuclear
worker could legally receive fifty times as much radiation as a member
of the public in a given year.14 This double standard is even more
troubling when one realizes that, before 1990, the public standard was
ten times stricter than the worker standard for ionizing radiation. After
13 Berman, supra n. 10, at 192-193; see also Kates, supra n. 12, at 168-174.
14 The United States, like most nations, follows the recommendations given in International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 1990 Recommendations of the ICRP, ICRP
Publication 60 (1991).
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1990, the public standard became fifty times stricter for a given year.
These numbers reveal that, while the government is doing a better job
of protecting the majority (members of the public), it may not be
doing the same for workers. This is especially true since there is no safe
level of ionizing radiation. Indeed, since 1990 worker protection from
ionizing radiation has been getting worse, not better.
The main reason United States policymakers do not believe that
equity or environmental justice demands the same standard for
occupational and public exposure to various pollutants is that they do
not believe the two types of exposures are analogous. Proponents of the
method of revealed preferences (for evaluating risks), 15 for example,
define occupational risks as voluntary risks, but public risks as
involuntary because people give no explicit consent to them. The
proponents of the CWD claim correctly that involuntarily imposed
risks ought to meet more stringent safety requirements. The
proponents, however, believe the double standard for occupational and
public risks is reasonable. 16 They also claim that risks accepted
"voluntarily," through one's occupation, can be regulated by means of
standards less strict than those applied to public risks. The proponents'
reasoning is that workers are compensated (through their wages) for the
higher workplace risks. Chauncey Starr and Kip Viscusi, two of the pre-
eminent proponents of the CWD and the method of revealed
preferences, claim that empirical data show that the risk entailed by a
particular occupation is directly proportional to the cube of the wages
for that occupation. They argue that as the risk increases, so do
wages. 17
15 See Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Risk Analysis and Scientific Method Chapter 2 (D.
Reidel Pub. Co. 1985). The method of revealed preferences consists of examining actual risk
levels faced in society, levels to which society allegedly gives implicit consent. The method of
expressed preferences consists of using survey data to determine people's risk preferences.
16 See Viscusi, supra n. 8; C. Starr, Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk, 165 Science
1232-1233 (Sept. 1969); see also Nicholas Rescher, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction 172
(1983)(argues that involuntary risks are less acceptable and hence ought to be subject to more
stringent standards).
17 See W. K Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 765-769 (MIT Press
2000); W.K. Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffi 6-8, 66-69 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (hereinafter
"Viscusi (1992)"); Starr, General Philosophy of Risk-Benefit Analysis, in Energy and the
Environment, a Risk Benefit Approach (Holt Ashley et al. eds., Pergamon 1976); Shrader-
Frechette, supra n. 15; W. S. Siebert & Xiangdong Wei, Wage Compensation for Job Risks,
Asian Econ.J. 171-181 (June 1998).
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Opponents of the CWD say the wage-risk relationship is not so
simple, especially in western countries. They claim many factors, in
addition to risk, determine the wages people accept for given work.
Some of these factors include the degree of education or training
necessary for the job, the extent to which people are available to
perform the work, the physical strength required to do the task, or the
lack of other employment opportunities. Hence, although there is some
sort of wage-risk relationship, such that wages often rise as job risks
increase, they say this relationship may not be nearly as simple as Starr
supposes. In fact, they note that different economists actually calculate
different CWDs, different increments of pay per risk increment. 18
Starr's view, widely accepted among risk assessors, is part of the
classic theory of the CWD. Adam Smith formulated the fundamental
economic principles of this theory long ago. As Smith expressed it, "the
whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different
employments of labor" continually tend toward equality because the
wages vary according to the hardship of occupation. Under Smith's
theory, people exposed to a risky workplace had advantages and
disadvantages, whose sum was equal to that for people not exposed to
such risks, because those in the high-risk occupations were provided
with higher rates of pay than those in low-risk jobs. According to
proponents of the CWD, a double standard for worker and public risk
is acceptable because those in high-risk jobs voluntarily agree to "trade"
some degree of workplace safety for higher wages. In other words, the
classic market solution to the problem of how to control occupational
risks, and how to decide which worker risks are acceptable, is to use an
"economic fix" for setting standards. 1 9 According to Smith,
employers using dangerous technologies will lack employees unless they
raise wages or offer some other inducement to attract workers. These
CWDs partially compensate workers for the expected economic costs
18 See e.g. Lee A. Craig, The Political Economy of Public Private Compensation
Differentials, J. of Econ. History 304-320 (June 1995); H. Frederick Gale, Labor
Productivity and Wages, Rev. of Regional Studies 13-26 (Summer 1998).
19 Viscusi, supra n. 8, at 156-168; Viscusi, supra n. 17; see also Ian M. Dobbs,
Compensating Wage Differentials, Economics Letters 103-109 (April 1999); Douglas
Maclean, Risk and Consent: A Survey of Issues for Centralized Decision Making 6-9 (Center
for Philosophy and Public Policy, 1981) (working paper, on file with the author) (Maclean
refers to the theory of compensating wage differentials as part of what he calls the "model of
implied consent."); Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous
Work, 52 Industrial and Labor Relations Rev. 1116-1135 (1998).
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of their later work-related injury or illness. Smith's theory also suggests
that the necessity for firms with risky jobs to pay higher wages also
gives them incentives to invest in safety and health precautions.
According to the theory, they can recover these investments in the form
of lower CWDs. Thus, Smith's theory predicts that workers will be
aware of many of the hazards to which they are exposed, that quit rates
will be higher in hazardous jobs, and that risky occupations will pay
higher wages than safe occupations.
Smith's theory of the CWD falls short on several counts.
Dangerous jobs typically are not filled by rational agents who are well
informed of the risks. Workers who have little formal education and
who have difficulty recognizing subtle hazards often have risky jobs.
This fact makes it important to note that at least two assumptions
underlie Adam Smith's theory of compensating differentials. First,
workers must be aware of the hazards they face. Second, they must
have a number of meaningful job possibilities. Both of these
assumptions often conflict with the real world. The number of realistic
job options enjoyed by different workers varies widely depending on
their skills and social status. To the extent that hazardous occupations
are filled with less skilled and socially disadvantaged workers, Smith's
theory requires that such jobs will offer meager CWDs.20
The Exploitation-Avoidance Argument
In arguing for a market mechanism, such as the CWD, to
compensate for the problems of alleged environmental injustice raised
by the double standard for occupational and public risk, economists,
risk assessors, and public policymakers often employ what I call "the
exploitation-avoidance argument." This essay will examine and evaluate
this argument in order to determine whether it succeeds in justifying
apparent environmental injustice.
The exploitation-avoidance argument begins with the recognition
that occupational safety and worker welfare are not always guaranteed
simply by letting market forces operate. Many economists realize that
employees can often be exploited by employers if the managers are not
forced to provide a safe working environment. To counteract this
20 Robinson, supra n. 12, at 5, 77; see Ashford, supra n. 6.
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tendency to exploit, economists maintain that workers have adequate
information about the risks they incur as a necessary condition for
ethical implementation of the CWD. These economists admit that "the
most salient" form of market failure is inadequate worker information.
They recognize that "if workers and firms are not fully cognizant of the
job risks resulting from their decisions, the desirable properties usually
imputed to market outcomes may not prevail." 2 1 To avoid worker
exploitation and market failure of the CWD, its proponents often
advocate employee education. Their view is that once worker education
is adequate, the CWD becomes defensible because market forces will
create optimal matchups between employees and occupations.
22
Obviously, the exploitation-avoidance argument is on sound
ground when it emphasizes the role of occupational-risk education. Its
flaw, however, is its major presupposition that education and
compensation alone provide sufficient grounds for worker consent and
autonomy. The argument takes too simplistic a stance as to the
requirements for legitimate consent and free choice. Other factors
besides workers' knowledge of a situation and their being compensated
for losses determine the moral quality of choices about that situation.
Even perfectly informed workers, who have consented to the level of
compensation for their high-risk jobs, nonetheless might have been
forced to take the work. This is especially true if alternative
employment opportunities were not available or if they needed the
money. If so, then in addition to workers having full knowledge of their
risk situation and being compensated for it, genuine market efficiency
and environmental justice also require that occupational choices be
made in a context of ethically desirable background conditions. Such
background conditions might include the operation of a free market
and the existence of alternative employment opportunities. Without
these background conditions, it is not clear that ethically desirable
employee-employment matchups will occur.23
21 Viscusi, supra n. 8, at 76, 77-87; see also Peter Dorman, Markets and Morality:
Economics, Dangerous Work & the Value of Human Life 42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
22 Viscusi (1992), supra n. 17, at 150; Viscusi et al., supra n. 17, at 770-771.
23 For further discussion of these background conditions, see John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Harv. Univ. Press 1971).
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Consider, for example, the situation of Appalachian (Appalachia
includes much of the states of Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia,
Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina.) coal miners. How
desirable are their wages and job conditions? It is well known that
mining is one of the highest-risk occupations and poorer workers are
typically employed in the most risky jobs.2 4 Moreover, residents of
Appalachia generally have no alternative to working in the mines unless
they want to move out of the region. There are few employment
alternatives because the Appalachian economy is not diversified, there is
no job training for a variety of occupations, and absentee corporations
(controlling 80% of all Appalachian land and mineral rights) also
control the only jobs. The Appalachian situation is often one of
monopsony, where owners of most of the land also control most of the
employment force.2 5
Even if Appalachian coal miners were compensated generously, and
they all had perfect information as to the dangers of their jobs,
background conditions in the Appalachian economy likely would
prevent their making minimally-voluntary choices to work in the mines.
If they were not able to make minimally-voluntary choices as to the
form of their employment, then it is not clear that proponents of the
CWD will succeed in arguing that the CWD justifies a riskier
workplace environment. Those who want to defend such an
environment face at least two obstacles. They seem unable to argue that
workers freely choose the risks if they are aware that their jobs are
extremely risky. They also are unable to argue convincingly that the
prevailing double standard (with respect to occupational and public
risks) is actually acceptable to workers. In fact, if background
conditions necessary for procedurally just choices (about forms of
employment) are not met, it is not clear that alleged acceptance of the
CWD is just. As John Rawls put it, "only against the background of a
24 See Leigh, supra n. 1 (to confirm the mining claim); see e.g. M. W. Jones-Lee, The
Value of Life: An Economic Analysis 39 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976); see also Starr, supra
n. 17, at 15; Dorman & Hagstrom, supra n. 19.
25 See John Egerton, Appalachia's Absentee Landlords, The Progressive 43-45 (June 1981);
J. Gaventa & W. Horton, Land and Ownership Patterns and their Impacts on Appalchian
Communities 25-59, 210-211 (Appalchian Land and Ownership Task Force, 1981); see also
D.E. Albrecht & S.H. Murdoc, The Sociology of U.S.Agriculture (Iowa State Univ. Press
1990) (see also Chapter 3 of this volume for discussion of Appalachian problems); Samantha
Friedman & Daniel Richter, Spatial Inequality and Poverty Among American Children,
Population Research and Policy Rev. 91-109 (Apr. 1998).
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just basic structure and a just arrangement of economic and social
institutions, can one say that the requisite just procedure [for
occupational and other choices] exists." 26
Despite the soundness of this insight about background conditions,
many economists and risk assessors often neglect it in their
considerations. For example, even the philosopher Nicholas Rescher
appears to neglect the role of background conditions in determining
ethically acceptable risk choices. He speaks, for example, of suicide as
being a "wholly voluntary" mode of death and of incurable disease as
being a "wholly involuntary" mode of death.27 Such language ignores
the importance of background conditions in determining what is more
or less voluntary. Death by suicide might not be "wholly voluntary," as
he says, if it is a consequence of medication-induced depression,
especially if the medication's side effects were unknown by the patient
and the doctor prescribing it. Likewise, death by incurable disease
might not be "wholly involuntary," as he says, if it is brought on more
quickly by a person's unwillingness to take proper medical treatments,
follow prescribed diets, and so on. In other words, the line between
what is voluntary and involuntary is quite uncertain in numerous cases.
To the degree that philosophers, economists, and risk assessors ignore
the numerous ways in which background conditions can affect the
voluntariness of an action - and therefore its environmental justice -
to that same extent they are also likely to misjudge the voluntariness
with which persons genuinely accept a particular level of risk in a
specific job. To the degree that they misjudge voluntariness, they also
are likely to propose inadequate theories about the ethics of risk
acceptability and environmental justice.
In addition to the Appalachian example, there is further evidence
for the thesis that, even with full information about risk, workers often
are unlikely to make minimally voluntary decisions to accept high-risk
employment. This evidence indicates that people who can afford to
avoid working in hazardous occupations usually do so. It is well known
that, apart from adventure recreation, as people's income increases, their
general willingness to accept extremely risky situations decreases.
28 If
26 See Rawls, supra n. 23, at 87.
27 Rescher, supra n. 16, at 173.
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this wealth-risk relationship holds, workers' alleged acceptance of high
occupational risks may be explicable more by the constraints imposed
by their low income and limited job skills than by their understanding
the dangers to which they are exposed.
Even if proponents of the exploitation-avoidance argument are
correct in believing that proper education of workers theoretically can
block exploitation of employees in high-risk occupations, it is still not
clear, practically speaking, that such education typically can be
accomplished. Even if education were a sufficient condition for insuring
that high-risk workers voluntarily accept the terms of their
employment, it is not clear that this condition could be met in most
situations. Two reasons for doubt exist. One reason is that if employers
provide full information, this would likely cut their workforce. 2 9 In
addition, those who accept high-risk jobs tend to be less educated and
thus less able to understand the risks they face. If full education is not
possible, it is not clear that one would be justified in implementing a
system of compensating wage differentials as a way to offset apparent
environmental injustice in the risky workplace.
What does empirical data reveal about employee risk education,
deliberately or out of negligence? Companies and regulators often have
kept their research findings about hazards secret from employees
exposed to them. In the case of vinyl chloride, for example, long before
anyone knew that workers at risk from liver cancer, there was strong
evidence to support a presumption of a serious occupational hazard.
Similarly, decades after countries such as Japan banned carcinogenic
dye ingredients from the workplace, American workers "are still
literally sloshing in them."3 0 When company doctors have been aware
of employment-induced illness (e.g., from asbestos in the Johns-
Manville factory in Pittsburg), they have often covered up this fact for
decades. 3 1
28 See e.g. B.A. Emmett et al., The Distribution of Environmental Quality, in
Environmental Assessment 367-371, 374 (D. Burkhardt & W. Ittelson eds., 1978); P.S. Albin,
Economic Values and the Value of Human Life, in Human Values and Economic Policy 97
(S. Hook ed., 1967); see also Jones-Lee, supra n. 24, at 20-55.
29 See e.g. Elaine Draper, Risky Business (1991) (documents that such risk information
typically is withheld by employers).
30 Eckholm, supra n. 9, at 33.
31 Berman, supra n. 10, at 1-4.
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Even some proponents of the CWD admit that:
available evidence suggests that few firms make a
comprehensive effort to inform workers of the risks
they face. For example, no firms tell their employees
the average annual death risk they face. Much
information that corporations do provide is not
intended to enable workers to assess the risk more
accurately. Rather, it is directed at lowering
employees' assessments of the risk. For example, the
most widespread claim by firms is that National
Safety Council statistics indicate that the worker is
safer on the job than at home.32
This statement is intentionally misleading because although the
average job is safer than living in the average home, clearly, risky jobs,
like mining, are not safer than living in the average home. If not, then
this frequent claim of employers is true only because it uses aggregate
and average data and not data about the riskiest jobs. The claim also
misleads because other factors account for homes, on average, being
riskier. Homes include old people and very young people, both more
prone to die than workers. According to this "healthy-worker" effect,
job-age people are less likely to die than average members of the
population. If so, then this healthy-worker effect is not a result of
especially safe workplaces. Moreover, many companies hire only the
healthiest workers after performing genetic tests on them. As a result,
such workers are likely to remain healthy, even in somewhat unsafe
work environments.33
In situations where there is no deceit on the part of employers
regarding the relevant risks faced by their employees and workers
receive full information, this is not enough to ensure that the practical
conditions necessary for wholly rational occupational choices have been
met. Even in the presence of complete company disclosure of threats,
employees exposed to high-risk situations typically take on the "it
32 Viscusi, supra n. 8, at 71.
33 Draper, supra n. 29, at 25.
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won't happen to me syndrome." 34 The pervasiveness of this syndrome
indicates that even when the theoretical conditions for full employee
education are met, they might not be satisfied in particular concrete
cases, owing to misperception on the part of the workers. This in turn
means that because their knowledge is not operative, many employees
likely are not making wholly voluntary decisions to work in high-risk
situations. 3 5 If not, then their decisions fail to justify the apparent
environmental injustices in risky workplaces.
A Case Study: 600,000 Department of Energy Workers
What happens to the CWD rationale for apparent environmental
injustice if one examines an empirical case pertaining to nuclear workers
exposed to high levels of ionizing radiation as a result of employment in
United States Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities? For
several reasons, the 600,000 current and former workers represent an
ideal case study for applying the exploitation-avoidance argument given
earlier. One would expect these nuclear workers to be treated better
than most labor groups throughout the world because they are, or have
been, employees of the United States government, or its contractors
and subcontractors. As employees of one of the richest governments in
the world, these workers, in theory, ought to receive excellent
treatment, in part because the DOE runs a multi-billion dollar
operation in the United States. Another reason DOE workers represent
an excellent case study is that they are such a large group. As a result, in
theory it should be possible to get statistically robust conclusions about
the wages and the risks to which the 600,000 employees are, and have
been exposed. Still another reason the group is an excellent one to
study is that roughly 1 / 6 th of it is unionized members belongs to the
Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Workers' Union. 3 6
This percentage of DOE union members is roughly the same as the
percentage of all United States workers who are unionized, so they may
constitute a fairly representative group at least relative to unionization.
34 Starr, supra n. 17, at 5.
35 Viscusi, supra n. 8, at 60-75.
36 H.R. Commerce Comm., Worker Safety at DOE Nuclear Facilities, 106th Cong. 57, 59
(1999) (testimony of Richard Miller) (hereinafter "1999 DOE House Hearing").
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The DOE has 3,500 nuclear facilities at thirty-four sites in thirteen
states of the United States. Eighty percent of these facilities are
defense-related and the remainder do commercial or laboratory work.
Twenty-three of the United States DOE facilities are national
laboratories, such as Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), and Sandia
National Laboratory (SNL). 37
For the exploitation-avoidance argument to succeed in using the
CWD to justify the riskier workplace environment, there must be
empirical evidence, in the nuclear case that employers adequately
educated their workforce about risks and thereby promoted their free
and efficient market choices. Has this worker education been adequate
in the DOE nuclear case? One reason that DOE workers do not have
full information and education is that careless DOE contractors often
keep it from them. For example, at the Mound facility in Miamisburg,
Ohio, from 1991 through 1994, Congressional testimony revealed that
the DOE contractor allowed bioassay samples from the workers to sit
on the shelf unanalyzed even though the workers were doing
decontamination activity involving dangerous materials, including
actinium-227. These employees were ordered to work, however,
"without knowing what isotopes they were likely to encounter." 38 By
1994, when the contractor finally analyzed the bioassay samples, the
results showed that fifteen of the thirty-one workers tested positive for
actinium-227 contamination. Even worse, the contractor withheld this
information from the DOE for another nine months. Finally, a
government assessment team came to the Mound facility and
concluded that there was no adequate dosimetry program, no
accredited lab doing the dosimetry and contamination work, no
radiation-worker safety program that complied with the laws and
regulations, no radiation-control technician, and no presentation of
exposure reports to the workers for three years. To correct these
problems, in 1996 the contractor filed a recovery plan. Yet by May of
37 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), DOE: Clear Strategy on External
Regulation Needed for Worker and Nuclear Facility Safety 4 (1998) (hereinafter "GAO DOE
Document").
38 1999 DOE House Hearing, supra n. 36, at 57-61.
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1997, the DOE discovered that most of the serious problems remained.
The contractor still was undercounting radiation exposures, was
improperly calculating worker uptakes of radionuclides, was not testing
all workers in the bioassay program, and was not requiring all workers
to have and wear respiratory protection to prevent ingestion of high
fired oxides of plutonium. In response to all this mismanagement,
coverup, delay, and illegal action over the five year period (1992
through 1997), the DOE assessed a penalty of only $112,000 less than
what OSHA could have assessed for only two days of such problems.
Such a trivial fine would not even cover the cancer care for one of the
exposed workers. Despite all the preceding problems, when the new
contractor took over the Mound facility in 1997, the DOE later
discovered that this company was deducting some radiation exposures
from its reports, was leaving worker bioassay samples unanalyzed for as
long as two years, and had not implemented a worker bioassay program
for metallic forms of tritium. 39
When Congress and the GAO show that radiation workers often do
not even have the results of their bioassays, during years when their
exposures exceed the allowable limits, it is difficult to argue that DOE
employees are informed about their occupational risks. If they are not
informed, then they hardly can make informed choices that avoid their
exploitation. Moreover, the Mound facility example does not appear to
be atypical. Congressional hearings revealed that at virtually all DOE
facilities, there were "significant and potentially widespread problems
with workers not adhering to nuclear safety procedures." 4 0 This
included "multiple and recurring failure to follow critical safety
procedures." 4 1 As a result, LLNL workers, for example, were
contaminated and LANL workers were subjected to fires and
explosions involving radioactive materials. 42
If DOE nuclear workers were aware of such problems, then it is
possible that they were able to make informed occupational choices to
39 Id.
40 H.R. Commerce Comm., Worker Safety at DOE Nuclear Facilities, 106th Cong. 98-99
(1999) (testimony of Upton).
41 Id
42 Id.
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accept both the risk and the CWD. However, they may not have been
aware of the risks, largely because at least three different governmental
oversight parties, Congress, the GAO, and the United States Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) confirmed that the DOE had engaged
in the widespread and repeated coverup of nuclear-safety problems.
The GAO concluded that the DOE has used secrecy as "a shield to
deflect public scrutiny" of its poor worker-safety and environmental
practices. 43 For 40 years, the DOE and its predecessor agencies have
said that "no releases" at its facilities posed a health threat. Yet, in
August of 1990, Congress noted that the Secretary of Energy, James D.
Watkins was forced to admit, in the face of overwhelming evidence
that thousands of children and members of the public had suffered
significant radiation doses because of the Hanford facility. The United
States OTA showed that as many as 13,000 United States children
received up to 70 rads of radiation because of the milk that they drank
was contaminated by releases from the Hanford facility. As a result, the
OTA warned that offsite health impacts from the DOE facilities were
likely. In addition, the OTA documented excess cancer deaths near the
Rocky Flats plant and an increase in leukemia among workers at the
Savannah River facility. The OTA noted that these findings were
consistent with an increase in childhood cancer among those whose
fathers worked at the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant in Britain, as
documented in the British Medical Journal.
44
The United States OTA also confirmed that the DOE has made it
almost impossible for non-DOE scientific researchers to have access to
DOE worker-exposure and safety records. The OTA noted, in its
report, that even states' Departments of Health have no access to the
DOE exposure and radiological-release records that might reveal causes
of illness and disease among their citizens. Confronted with all the
DOE coverups and lies, the OTA recommended establishment of a
new agency and the external regulation of DOE.4 5 Such evidence and
OTA recommendations argue against the claim that DOE workers
have information that is essential to avoid worker exploitation in
choosing the CWD and its attendant risks.
43 GAO DOE Document, supra n. 37, at 3.
44 United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), CC, at 8, 77, 80, 84, 99-100.
45 Id. at 111,138-143.
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Of course, even though government oversight shows DOE has
covered-up safety records, nevertheless, such records do not accurately
reveal the threats DOE operations pose to nuclear workers and the
public. Rather, United States Congressional hearings revealed that
DOE dosimetry data is inaccurate and incomplete. Despite the fact
that conditions at the DOE facilities have been "extremely hazardous,"
nevertheless, "monitoring programs ... were inaccurate, and in many
cases, nonexistent. "46 After 40 years of United States DOE nuclear
facilities, Congress discovered in the late 1980s that the "DOE health
and safety program was solidly in shambles" and that levels of
radioactivity "repeatedly" exceeded the maximum allowable levels at
United States DOE installations. 47 A Congressional appraisal at
Rocky Flats noted that it had "inadequate capabilities for monitoring
and sampling air," that there was no instrument calibration program at
the facility, and that its dosimetry data are inaccurate.4 8 Fernald, one
nuclear facility, claimed there was complete exposure data on only 150
of several thousand nuclear workers. Congressional investigations
showed, for example, that Fernald nuclear workers were allowed to
leave the site even though they were contaminated. Operators at
Fernald said that the accuracy of its radiation-dose monitors was plus
or minus 100%. To cover up these worker-safety problems,
Congressional investigators discovered that DOE contractors
repeatedly applied "correction factors" to worker dosimetry-badge
data. This was done to reduce the apparent radiation doses to workers.
In a number of cases, the "correction" was so extreme that some worker
doses were listed as negative. 4 9 As a GAO official put it, "[P]roblems
exist with monitoring workers' exposures and collecting exposure data
at DOE sites." 5 0 Even according to the DOE, as late as 1989, air-
sampling techniques were inadequate at 83% of its facilities. 5 1 An
additional problem with the DOE worker-exposure data is that
46 H.R. GAO, 101st Cong. 1-2, 3-15, 70 (1994) (testimony of John Dingell, James Wells &




50 Id. (alteration in original).
51 Id.
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employees often have not returned the dosimeters while measurements
for many workers are missing. When occupational exposures are
unknown, even the DOE admitted that it often recorded these missing
doses as zero rather than as uncertain. Hence, a zero in the dosimetry
data could mean a zero dose, an unknown dose, or an unmonitored
dose. 52
Given all of these dosimetry problems, it is not surprising that the
United States GAO concluded that "for most DOE facilities, the
methods used to calculate recorded radiological doses for workers
varied considerably over the years documentation is fragmented."'53 A
1989 National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences review
of worker health and safety at DOE facilities concluded that data was
"inadequate" to determine worker safety. And DOEs own internal
reviews in 1989 and 1999 "found thousands of problems with
radioactive monitoring practices and the actual dosimetry information
the individual dosimetry devices suffer from inadequate calibration, so
even the data that they did have appears to be not very credible."
5 4
Given such findings, the GAO concluded: "DOEs credibility in this
area [dosimetry to establish worker safety and health] has been almost
zero." 5 5 Although DOE admitted that 2,000 employees had
exceeded the five-rem annual exposure limit, even this claim is likely
too low because of the "lack of workplace exposure data" that are
reliable. As a result, the GAO said that it is impossible to tell what has
caused the high rates of recurrent illnesses among DOE nuclear
workers. DOE officials admitted in 1994 that worker-exposure data
was unreliable because some exposures were not measured, some were
measured with uncalibrated or incorrect instruments, some were
reported incorrectly, and some were lost. As a result, the top DOE
health official admitted that "the application of DOE exposure data in
the field of epidemiological studies is unsatisfactory." 56 Using DOE
52 Id.
53 1994 GAO House Hearing, supra n. 46, at 15-22, 25 (testimony of James Wells); id. at
34, 40, 43 (testimony of O'Toole).
54 Id.
55 Id. (alteration in original).
56 Id.
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exposure data in studies is unreliable in part because of the absence of
reliable data on internal doses, because of limited data on chemical
exposures, and because most data is not linkable to individuals. 57
United States Congressional investigators concluded that it is
impossible to fully reconstruct what has happened to workers at DOE
nuclear facilities because only paper records of exposures have been
available for the last 50 years. The investigators also noted that the
radiation badges are gone and the paper data makes it difficult to
aggregate worker-exposure levels across the nuclear industry. As late as
1994, Congress revealed that only seven of DOE's thirty-three types of
facilities were covered under its medical monitoring program for
workers. Congressional investigators noted that DOE health and safety
data was unreliable because, for the most part, workers who contracted
cancer or other diseases simply retired and did not remain part of any
monitoring program. Because former DOE workers retired when they
became ill, their only assistance was from state workers' compensation
programs, and because the DOE did not take care of them, Congress
affirmed that the DOE does not have accurate data on workplace-
induced health problems. For all of these reasons, it is not surprising
that DOE worker-exposure data, on the admission of DOE officials,
has been contested in the courts.
Recognizing the problems with exposures to the 600,000 nuclear
workers, President Clinton, in April of 2000, promised that all nuclear
workers would have government financed compensation and health care
for their ailments. Because of inadequate dose and exposure records,
Clinton further guaranteed that all missing or unknown dose data
would be assumed to be at the maximum level. In late 2000, Congress
passed the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act. 58 The act gave the DOE responsibilities to: (1) locate
workers who are potential applicants for compensation for radiation-
induced illness; (2) educate them about the compensation program;
and (3) help workers and families file claims. 5 9 The Energy and
57 Id.
58 Id. at 7-14, 22 (testimony of James Wells); id. at 32-33 (testimony of O'Toole). For
information on the DOE program mandated by the 2000 law, see information updated July
31, 2001 from http:ltis.eh.doe.govladvocacyl factsheets/factsheet010622. pdf and for the
current status of the program, see http://tis.eh.doe.gov/advocacy/status/ status.html
(hereinafter "DOE Web Page").
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Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program officially
began on July 31, 2001, and the Department of Labor is administering
the program. The DOE, however, is providing the DOL with
employment and medical records to support the claims' process.
60
Because the site operators and the DOE control the DOE worker
employment and medical data, it is questionable whether the
compensation program will be effective. If, Congress and the United
States Office of Technology's Assessment that an outside monitoring
and oversight agency is needed to oversee DOE activities to ensure that
DOE follows health and safety regulations, then there still are likely to
be problems at the DOE, given that there is no external oversight
agency. In any case, the DOE situation clearly shows that United States
nuclear workers have not been informed fully of their occupational
risks, in part because the record-keeping has been so poor.
A final reason for doubting that DOE nuclear workers are informed
of occupational risks to the degree requisite to avoid their exploitation
is that DOE is well known for retaliating against employees who reveal
safety problems or try to have them corrected. Even DOE officials have
admitted this and said that workers who noted safety problems were
threatened with harassment, the loss of their jobs, and their security
clearances. DOE also forced employee-whistleblowers to see
psychiatrists. The GAO noted that when David Lappa of LLNL
revealed critical safety problems and tried to have them fixed, problems
for which LLNL was given "phantom fines," the DOE harassed and
demoted him, even though the United States Department of Labor
concluded that there was merit in his safety concerns.
6 1
Because of all the lies, coverup, and information gaps regarding
nuclear-worker safety, as documented by the United States Congress,
GAO, and OTA, it is questionable whether the exploitation-avoidance
argument can succeed in the DOEs case. And if so, then it may not be
possible to use the CWD to justify the riskier nuclear-workplace




61 H.R. Commerce Comm., Worker Safety at DOE Nuclear Facilities, 106th Cong. 32
(1999) (testimony of Jones); id. at 32-33, 40, 43 (1999) (testimony of O'Toole).
62 See DOE Webpage, supra n. 58 (for current DOE activities).
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Not only has the DOE lied and covered-up vital safety
information, but it has retaliated against workers who were
whistleblowers and has used taxpayer money to fight against employees
who have raised safety concerns. In one three-year period, for example,
Congressional testimony revealed that the DOE reimbursed attorneys
for $50 million in legal expenses used to fight workers' safety
charges. 63 Congressional testimony also revealed that the DOE and its
contractors were able to stop press releases about safety and health
violations at its facilities, so that newspapers never printed the
information. Given such a coverup, it is questionable whether the DOE
did an adequate job of educating either the public or its own workers
about nuclear safety.64 If the DOE did not fulfill the educational role
necessary to the exploitation-avoidance argument, then this suggests yet
another reason that CWD arguments probably do not succeed in
justifying apparent environmental injustices at risky DOE workplaces.
Conclusions and Alternatives
This analysis of arguments about using the CWD to justify more
dangerous workplace environments suggests that appeal to the CWD is
not adequate grounds for defending a double standard with respect to
occupational and public risks. Compensation and voluntary choice of
occupation may not guarantee that a particular level of worker risk is
ethically acceptable, any more than compensation and consent
guarantee that other alleged environmental injustices are ethically
acceptable. If particular actions are wrong, such as engaging in
nontherapeutic experimentation on human beings, then the fact that
people may have consented to the experimentation, or that they may
have been compensated for it, does not change the ethical quality of the
act of experimentation from "undesirable" to "desirable." Consent and
compensation do render a questionable act less undesirable than it
otherwise might have been. Nevertheless, consent and compensation
alone do not appear to justify a double standard for occupational and
public risk.
63 See 1994 GAO House Hearing, supra n. 46, at 86 (testimony ofJohn Dingell).
64 See H.R. Commerce Comm., supra n. 61, at 5, 43-49 (testimony ofJones).
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Although there is an ethical and legal requirement for informed
consent on the part of patients being treated by a medical doctor, one
of the limitations of the current CWD policy is that there are no
comparable legal requirements for guaranteeing background conditions
for informed consent in the workplace. Applying the medical-ethics
analogy, one might well argue, for example, that just as people now
claim that a doctor's withholding information from a patient is a
violation of the medical doctor's fiduciary role and a way of
undermining the patient's autonomy, an analogous point holds in the
workplace. That is, an employer's withholding risk information from an
employee is a violation of the employer's fiduciary role and a way of
undermining the employee's autonomy. If there were recognized
ethical and legal requirements for attempting to guarantee background
conditions necessary to informed consent in the workplace, then the
case for the ethical acceptability of the CWD would be much stronger.
